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Fields of Concentration:

Primary Field(s): Industrial Organization

Secondary Field(s): Urban Economics, Spatial Economics, Innovation

Qualifying Examinations Completed:

2022 (Oral): Industrial Organization, Econometrics

2021 (Written): Macroeconomics, Microeconomics

Dissertation Title: *Essays on Industrial Organization, Urban Economics, and Innovation*

Committee:

Professor Katja Seim (Chair)

Professor Steven Berry

Professor Cody Cook

Professor Philip Haile (Teaching Reference)

Professor Benjamin Polak (Teaching Reference)

Education:

Ph.D., Economics, Yale University, 2026 (expected)

M.Phil., Economics, Yale University, 2023

M.A., Economics, Yale University, 2022

M.Sc., Econometrics and Mathematical Economics, London School of Economics, 2019
(*with distinction*)

B.A., Mathematics (*with honors*) and Economics, Macalester College, 2018
(*summa cum laude*)

Fellowships, Honors and Awards:

Dissertation Fellowship, Yale University, 2025

Raymond Powell Teaching Prize, Yale University, 2022-2023

Cowles Foundation Fellowship, Yale University, 2020-2025

Doctoral Fellowship, Yale University, 2020-2026

Robert L. Bunting Award, Macalester College, 2018

Kofi Annan Scholarship, Macalester College, 2014-2018

Research Grants:

Graduate Student Research Support, Department of Economics, Yale University, 2024
Allianz Life Summer Research Fund, Macalester College, 2017

Teaching Experience:*Yale University*

Fall 2024, Teaching Assistant to Prof. Benjamin Polak, *Game Theory* (U)
Spring 2024, Teaching Assistant to Prof. Benjamin Polak and Prof. Jidong Zhou, *Games and Information* (MBA and U)
Fall 2023, Teaching Assistant to Prof. Benjamin Polak, *Game Theory* (U)
Spring 2023, Teaching Assistant to Prof. Philip Haile, *Firms, Markets, and Competition* (U)
Fall 2022, Teaching Assistant to Dr. Evangelia Chalioti, *Intermediate Microeconomics* (U)

Macalester College

Fall 2016, Preceptor for Prof. Andrew Beveridge, *Combinatorics* (U)
Spring 2016, Preceptor for Prof. Shilad Sen, *Core Concepts in Computer Science* (U)
Fall 2015, Preceptor for Prof. Daniel Flath, *Applied Multivariable Calculus III* (U)
Fall 2015, Preceptor for Prof. David Bressoud, *Applied Multivariable Calculus I* (U)

Research Experience:

Research Assistant to Prof. Mitsuru Igami, Yale University, 2021-2023
Research Assistant to Prof. Kensuke Teshima, Hitotsubashi University, 2020

Working Papers:

“The Trade-Offs of Curbside Parking: Evidence from Demand-Based Pricing” with Hoang-Anh Nguyen (November 2025), *Job Market Paper*

“Welfare Gains from Product and Process Innovations: The Case of LCD Panels, 2001–2011” with Mitsuru Igami, Shoki Kusaka, and Jeff Qiu (September 2025), *R&R at Econometrica*

Work In Progress:

“Retail Landscape and Spatial Spillovers: Evidence from San Francisco” with Hoang-Anh Nguyen (November 2025)

Conference Presentation:

2018: The 17th Carroll Round Conference at Georgetown University

Languages:

Vietnamese (native), English (fluent)

References:

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Dissertation Abstract

The Trade-Offs of Curbside Parking: Evidence from Demand-Based Pricing [Job Market Paper]

with Hoang-Anh Nguyen

City governments face a trade-off in managing curb space: providing parking to facilitate access to consumption amenities and generate revenue, versus allocating it to alternative land uses. Most cities keep curbside parking free or subsidized, creating two inefficiencies: first, excess demand resulting in cruising for curbside parking, and second, systematic undervaluation of urban land. This paper uses San Francisco's citywide demand-based parking pricing, which sets meter rates by time and location in response to past demand, to estimate a structural model of drivers' joint destination and parking choices. We use the model to quantify the welfare implications of curbside parking, measured by city revenue, driver surplus, and time costs of cruising, and evaluate alternative policies for managing curb space through parking instruments.

San Francisco is an ideal setting for our study for two reasons. First, it offers a unique opportunity to evaluate demand-based pricing in practice, one of the most significant reforms in allocating public parking space. While economic and engineering theory advocates for this pricing scheme, empirical economic evidence on its welfare impacts remains limited. Second, San Francisco provides high-quality and granular parking and urban planning data, which we leverage to estimate our model and construct instruments for endogenous variables such as parking prices and parking availability.

Our economic model represents drivers' joint decisions on destinations and parking locations, incorporating how parking considerations factor into travel decisions. In the first stage, individuals choose which destination to visit under imperfect information about parking availability. In the second, conditional on that choice, they decide where to park nearby. If no curbside space is available at the chosen parking location, drivers then cruise to a parking garage, and this cruising behavior adds to traffic externalities. We model this two-stage decision with a nested logit. To estimate the model, we construct a dataset combining high-frequency metered parking transactions from the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency with GPS data of mobile-device visits to points of interest from Veraset. These datasets allow us to link drivers' parking choices to their travel destinations.

We arrive at three main findings. First, compared to a revenue-maximizing uniform pricing scheme, San Francisco's demand-based pricing generates about 30% higher revenue while reducing cruising trips by nearly 70%. Second, while drivers value curbside parking, the present discounted value of parking revenue and driver surplus generally falls short of local assessed land values, which proxy for the economic value of land uses, suggesting that curb space may be inefficiently allocated. Finally, our counterfactuals show that reducing parking supply by roughly 6% and lowering the status quo demand-based prices by \$1.25 citywide preserves parking welfare, with only a modest revenue loss, while freeing curb space for other uses.

Welfare Gains from Product and Process Innovations: The Case of LCD Panels, 2001–2011

with Mitsuru Igami, Shoki Kusaka, and Jeff Qiu

R&R at Econometrica

Measuring innovations and their welfare contributions is fundamental to understanding how technological progress improves living standards and informs innovation policies. In this paper, we examine the welfare gains from innovations in the global market for liquid crystal display (LCD) panels, using unusually comprehensive data on sales, manufacturing costs, and investments in LCD fabrication plants. We construct and estimate a structural model of demand and supply of LCD products to quantify the contributions of different types of innovation in this high-tech industry. Our results show that the social return on technological investment was positive; however, intense competition led to most price reductions being passed on to consumers, resulting in modest private returns for producers. We measure product innovation (new product introduction) and process innovation (productivity growth) and find that both contribute substantially to social benefits. We further examine how market structure affects innovation incentives through counterfactual merger simulations. The majority of hypothetical mergers would have reduced both total surplus and industry-wide innovation incentives, suggesting that justifying mergers on innovation grounds would be difficult absent merger-specific efficiency gains.

Retail Landscape and Spatial Spillovers: Evidence from San Francisco

with Hoang-Anh Nguyen

Work in Progress

In this project, we study how competition and spillovers (e.g., scale economies, trip chaining) among nearby urban amenities shape their entry and location choices under persistent shocks, such as work-from-home (WFH) adoption and rezoning. We combine San Francisco's business registry, which records establishment entry, exit, and relocation, with Veraset GPS foot-traffic data to examine the supply and demand for urban amenities. We document that establishments within small spatial units (e.g., Census block groups) can attract noticeably different amounts of foot traffic, controlling for amenity category, parcel size, and brand name. We interpret this variation as evidence of local quality heterogeneity. This within-location heterogeneity gives rise to spillovers across amenity categories and between establishments of different quality levels, which would otherwise be masked in a homogeneous-firm setting. Motivated by this evidence, we develop a spatial equilibrium model in which heterogeneous consumers choose amenities and heterogeneous establishments choose locations, accounting for competition and local spillovers. This framework allows us to evaluate counterfactual WFH and rezoning policies. WFH reduces worker demand in the city, while rezoning, such as converting offices to housing or retail space, shifts demand from workers to residents and incentivizes amenity entry through increased retail space. These shocks are expected to reshape the city's retail landscape significantly.